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Since the Northern Mali war of 2012, the Sahel countries have seen sub-
stantial international aid and military involvement. Yet, the region is more 
fragile than ever. As jihadist groups have established themselves through-
out Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, violence has escalated dramatically and 
states have been pushed to the brink of collapse. In August 2020, after weeks 
of public unrest, Mali’s government was toppled by a military coup. There 
is a palpable need to rethink international engagement in the Sahel region.
 • Policymakers in Africa and Europe must realise that governments are involved 
in asymmetric conflicts that they cannot win militarily. Parts of the Sahel will 
remain ungovernable for the foreseeable future. As the situation takes a grow-
ing toll on societies, state legitimacy and social order are eroding. 
 • National policy and international assistance risk doing further damage, by nar-
rowly focusing on counterterrorism, by taking sides in local conflicts, and by 
fuelling corruption through ill-designed development programmes. To prevent 
these unintended consequences, policymakers should adopt a holistic under-
standing of the Sahel crisis that explicitly considers the risks and consequences 
of military and development interventions. 
 • Governments and their international partners still lack coherent strategies to 
mitigate the impacts of violent jihadism on states and societies, to strengthen 
state–society relations and to address growing intercommunal violence. 
Policy Implications
International involvement, including military assistance, is necessary to stop the 
spiral of violence and counter state fragility in the Sahel region. However, it must 
be centred on the objective of strengthening state–society relations. Preventing 
abuses against civilians and advocating for profound security-sector reform 
should be top priorities. Governments must begin to address growing injustices 
and economic grievances at the local level, to prevent further intercommunal 
violence. At the same time, targeted strategies need to be developed to under-
mine jihadists’ recruitment strategies, intimidation tactics, revenue streams, and 
internal cohesion.
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Growing Violence and Collapsing State Legitimacy
Over the past five years, the countries of the Western Sahel region – Mali, Burkina 
Faso, and Niger – have experienced an unprecedented escalation of violent conflict. 
By the numbers alone, this wave of violence dwarfs the Northern Mali civil war of 
2012, with an annual death toll of 4,807 in 2019 and of 4,345 in just the first half 
of 2020 (author’s own calculation with data from the Armed Conflict Location & 
Event Data Project). To date, over 2.7 million people have been displaced (UNHCR 
2020), the majority of whom are internally displaced people living in precarious 
conditions. The escalation of violence is centred on the border regions of Mali, Bur-
kina Faso, and Niger (referred to as the larger Liptako-Gourma region) and Central 
Mali, but jihadist attacks have also increasingly spilled over to the east and west 
of Burkina Faso, as well as to the border regions of Côte d’Ivoire and Benin (see 
Figure 1 below). 
A closer look at the types of violent events highlights several disturbing trends. 
The number of attacks on civilians has been increasing dramatically, eclipsing fights 
between armed groups and security forces (see Figure 2 below). Violence against ci-
vilians is, to a considerable extent, committed by jihadist groups. [1] These include 
the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) in Mali and 
Burkina Faso and the Islamic State (IS) in Niger’s Tillaberi region and in the border 
regions of Burkina Faso and Mali. However, security forces and local self-defence 
groups are responsible for a growing share of civilian deaths (see Figure 3 below). 
By now, security forces and self-defence groups each account for more annual civil-
ian deaths than jihadists, although it is possible that many attacks on civilians by 
the latter remain unattributed. 
The current escalation of violent conflict has, without doubt, been triggered by 
the presence of jihadist groups. However, as social order deteriorated, misguided 
responses by security forces and the growing escalation of intercommunal conflicts 
(often involving self-defence militias) have become as much a source of violence 
and instability as the jihadist groups themselves. Long-standing internal crises of 
the Sahel states are coming to the surface and are limiting governments’ ability to 
cope with the jihadist threat. As insecurity continues to dominate daily life, admin-
istration and public services have been shuttered, thousands of schools closed or 
destroyed, and teachers and administrators have fled the area. Security forces have 
been put in situations for which they were never prepared, trained, or equipped, nor 
have they been subject to political oversight or judicial accountability. Pre-existing 
conflicts – particularly between pastoralist Fulani (Peulh) and agrarian communi-
ties – which had been peacefully managed for generations are now being manipu-
lated by jihadists. This has resulted in instances of mass violence and a rapid ero-
sion of community institutions. As the spiral of violence and retaliation escalates, 
governments are losing access to local communities while also facing growing levels 
of political discontent. Democratic institutions and public order are becoming in-
creasingly difficult to sustain. States of the region are being pushed to the brink of 
collapse, with jihadist groups viciously exploiting their vulnerability. 
1 The term “jihadist 
groups” is used as an ab-
breviation for the concept 
of “violent Salafi jihadist 
groups” (Kepel 2002).
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Figure 1 
Jihadist Attacks in the 
Western Sahel
Source: Author’s own 
classification and visu-
alization, based on ACLED 
conflict event data.
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Jihadism and State Fragility: A Vicious Cycle
State fragility is both a cause and a consequence of violent jihadism in the Sahel. 
Long neglected by central governments, the border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, 
and Niger were predestined to be targeted by jihadist groups, who thrive in areas 
where they go unchecked by governments. Effective state authority has been absent 
from large parts of this region for a long time (by some accounts, since the fall 
of the Songhay Empire in the sixteenth century). Long prior to jihadists’ involve-
ment, illicit trans-Sahara trade – which includes the smuggling of drugs, arms, and 
Figure 2 
Violent Conflict in 
Burkina Faso, Mali, 
and Niger is Taking 
a Growing Toll on 
Civilians 
Source: Author’s own 
calculation, based on 
ACLED conflict event 
data.
Figure 3 
Security Forces and 
Self-Defence Groups 
are Responsible for 
a Growing Share of 
Civilian Deaths 
Source: Author’s own 
classification, based on 
ACLED conflict event 
data.
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counterfeit medicine – has had an outsized economic and political influence in the 
region (Gaye 2018). Human trafficking, artisanal gold mining, poaching, and the 
looting of archaeological artefacts complement the range of illicit and extractive 
activities in the area. 
These activities thrive in the absence of state authority, do not require long-
term investments, and are by orders of magnitude more profitable than any station-
ary economic activity. Thus, there have never been strong economic incentives to 
establish a monopoly on violence. For decades, the governments of Mali, Burkina 
Faso, and Niger instead relied on local strongmen as proxies, while corrupt pol-
itical elites colluded with organised crime networks to secure a share in illicit rev-
enues. In an essentially stateless environment, armed banditry flourished, leading 
to the increasing militarisation of smuggling activities and a growing circulation 
of weapons. In this environment, jihadist groups found not only opportunities to 
retreat and raise revenue, but also local communities who had little reason to work 
 together with governments they had hardly ever experienced in positive ways. 
Jihadist activity in the Western Sahel has not always targeted the state. Origi-
nally consisting mainly of North African members, jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been present in the Western Sahel since the 
end of the Algerian civil war around 2002. Over the subsequent decade, the Salafi 
jihadist movement began to attract a heterogeneous group of local fortune-seekers 
and fanatics – including warlords such as former Tuareg rebel leader Iyad Ag Ghaly, 
who went on to found the Malian group Ansar Dine. Prior to 2012, jihadist fight-
ers operated mostly clandestinely, focusing on kidnappings as a lucrative source of 
revenue while avoiding openly challenging the government. In the Bush-era War on 
Terror, governments were able to use the presence of Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups to 
their advantage on the international stage. 
Jihadists’ decisions to challenge the state were driven by moments of politi-
cal opportunity. The Northern Mali conflict, which started as a Tuareg rebellion in 
2012, created a power vacuum in which several Islamist groups managed – within a 
matter of months – to gain control over all major cities and transportation hubs of 
Northern Mali and were advancing further south until they were stopped by French 
military intervention in 2013. Then, 2015 was a fateful year. The collapse of Blaise 
Compaoré’s authoritarian regime in Burkina Faso created a power vacuum, as it 
upended the regime’s reciprocal relationships with local strongmen – including al-
leged tacit arrangements with organised crime networks and Al-Qaeda-affiliated 
groups. Jihadists from Mali, under pressure from the international military pres-
ence, were actively recruiting in Burkina Faso and intimidating communities near 
jihadists’ areas of retreat. By 2016, Burkina Faso-based Ansarul Islam was engaged 
in a low-intensity war against Burkinabé security forces. 
Simultaneously, the anti–Boko Haram offensive in the Lake Chad region – re-
capturing a territory the size of Belgium in northern Nigeria – put pressure on IS-
affiliated jihadists. This accelerated the spread of IS activities into Niger’s Tillabéri 
region, bordering Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali. The second Libyan civil war, in 
turn, created a power vacuum that enabled IS-affiliated groups to establish control 
over trafficking and oil exports. By 2016, IS-affiliated jihadists had thus become 
active in a corridor from Nigeria to the Mediterranean, while Al-Qaeda-affiliated 
groups were operating from the Maghreb to Burkina Faso. 
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The rapid expansion of jihadists’ influence in the Western Sahel depended cru-
cially on their ability to intimidate local communities. Unlike political rebel groups, 
such as Tuareg and Arab separatists in Mali, jihadist groups had no mass support. 
Especially in a country like Burkina Faso, which has a long history of inter-religious 
and interethnic tolerance and local traditions of Islam that are themselves victim-
ised by jihadists’ imported radical Salafist ideology (International Crisis Group 
2017), jihadists’ social basis is thin on the ground. Yet, they were able to prevent lo-
cal communities from cooperating with governments and security forces, thanks to 
their reputation for violence and cruelty, their access to superior weaponry, and the 
visible failure of security forces to stand up to them. With only relatively small num-
bers of local recruits, jihadist groups have succeeded in targeting opposing indi-
viduals (such as religious leaders, traditional authorities, teachers, or other people 
willing to resist jihadists) and projecting their power through large social networks. 
For example, threats of collective punishment against whole families or villages 
have kept local recruits from defecting. Jihadist groups have also not hesitated to 
use their own members as hostages vis-à-vis their families and villages. Through 
credible threats of retaliation and collective punishment, jihadists command an 
outsized ability to intimidate and compromise local communities. 
To diminish state authority and establish control over lucrative revenue 
streams, jihadist groups have flexibly employed a number of strategies. Following 
an initial phase of infiltration, jihadists have used targeted attacks against state 
installations such as schools, police posts, and municipal offices to disrupt public 
order. This caused a massive exodus of civilian state representatives, widespread 
school closures, and a partial breakdown of public services. With security forces 
scrambling to regain control, hundreds of thousands of citizens have been displaced 
from war zones. This facilitated jihadists’ gaining control over important smug-
gling routes and mining sites, such as artisanal gold mines in Burkina Faso, where 
they displaced corrupt state agents and began to collect informal taxes (Lewis and 
 McNeill 2019). At times, miners’ discontent with the governments’ attempts at reg-
ulation has played into the hand of jihadists. 
An increasingly important part of jihadists’ wholesale assault on social order 
is the manipulation of pre-existing conflicts. Jihadist presence has become a factor 
in a whole range of social conflicts, including intergenerational strife, political and 
clan rivalries, protection against armed bandits, tensions between local commu-
nities and the state, and, most importantly, intercommunal and interethnic con-
flicts (International Crisis Group 2020a). Most consistently, jihadists have used 
long-standing tensions between pastoralist Fulani (Peulh) communities and local 
agrarian communities of different ethnic origin, such as Dogon in Mali’s Mopti re-
gion, Mossi and Gourmantché in Burkina Faso, and Hausa in Niger and Nigeria. By 
framing themselves as defenders of Fulani interests, jihadist groups such as Katiba 
Macina in Mali (which named itself after a theocratic Fulani state that existed in 
the early nineteenth century), Ansarul Islam in Burkina Faso and IS in Niger have 
fuelled the stigmatisation of Fulani – making them targets of both state repression 
and local conflict. Since then, armed violence between ethnic groups has increased 
at an alarming rate. 
The emergence of community-based self-defence groups, such as the  Koglwéogo 
in Burkina Faso, has increased the escalation potential of local conflicts. Such 
groups are a direct consequence of faltering state control. In Burkina Faso, the pol-
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itical vacuum of 2015 led to a wave of crime and armed banditry, forcing communi-
ties to take security matters into their own hands (Leclercq and Matagne 2020). In 
western Burkina Faso and central Mali, traditional hunter fraternities (Dozo) filled 
the void in local security provision and enforcement of justice, while in other areas 
new militias were formed. While these armed self-defence groups are often the only 
security provider in rural areas, their existence has increased the capacity for or-
ganised violence and thus the escalation potential of intercommunal conflicts, such 
as farmer–herder disputes. In response specifically ethnic self-defence militias are 
increasingly emerging, while jihadist groups have been trying to turn these groups 
against each other. On various occasions, jihadists are believed to have instigated 
or aggravated mass violence, by committing attacks that have then been blamed on 
Fulani, as in the case of the Yirgou massacre in Burkina Faso, or framing themselves 
as the defenders of Fulani, as Katiba Macina did in the aftermath of the Ogossagou 
massacre in Mali. 
As jihadists seek to consolidate power in the areas under their control, anti-
state propaganda and symbolic politics play a growing role. Besides being involved 
in security provision (for both legitimate and illegitimate activities) and the pun-
ishment of rule violators, jihadists selectively provide public goods when doing so 
helps them to further delegitimise the state. Jihadists pose as defenders of local or 
ethnic interests, attempt to co-opt locally influential individuals, and engage in bru-
tal persecution of people accused of collaboration with the state or of violating strict 
religious prescriptions (International Crisis Group 2020b). As time passes, these 
efforts erode social cohesion and may increase resentment against the state. It may 
become harder and harder for governments to gain the trust of local communities 
that were never close to the state to begin with.
The Limitations of International Intervention
International intervention was prompted by the acute need to avert state collapse in 
Mali in 2013. While initially successful in fulfilling this goal, it has failed to stabilise 
the region as a whole. A growing consensus is emerging that, in their current form, 
international responses to the Sahel crisis have failed to address a central aspect of 
it: weak state structures, which are not only at the heart of the crisis but progres-
sively deteriorating (Schiller 2020). At present, there is no plausible scenario in 
which military operations or development aid in their current forms will increase 
loyalty to the state in the areas most at risk from jihadist groups. 
One reason is that jihadist groups in the Sahel have proved themselves extraor-
dinary resilient, flexible, and adept at exploiting the vulnerabilities of both the state 
and of international security forces. As counterterrorism operations have been 
ramped up, jihadist groups have not only become more resourceful and sophisti-
cated in their tactics to challenge security forces through ambushes and remote 
violence, but have also become more effective at profiting from illicit activities (As-
sanvo et al. 2019) – that alongside escalating and positioning themselves within lo-
cal conflicts. As a consequence, jihadists have been able to more than offset periodic 
military losses through increased recruitment, drawing on a growing population of 
people who have suffered injustices at the hands of security forces. 
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Government security forces appear to have contributed more to the problem 
of faltering state authority than to its resolution. The counterterrorism campaign 
has not only exposed the vulnerability of security forces but also, especially, their 
failure to protect local communities, not to mention their tendency to respond with 
abuse, brutality, and extrajudicial killings against civilians suspected of collabo-
rating with jihadist groups. Recurring, well-documented abuses (Human Rights 
Watch 2019) demonstrate that security forces are not adequately trained or moni-
tored, and, more importantly, treat local populations as enemies rather than allies 
in the fight against jihadist groups. Meanwhile, military capacity-building via the 
European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali has focused on narrow tactical and 
defensive skills – which were already of questionable use in an asymmetric conflict 
setting. EUTM Mali has addressed neither the need to prevent abuses against civil-
ians and local communities nor the root causes of corruption and dysfunctionality 
in the military. Given that asymmetric warfare against jihadist groups can only suc-
ceed with information from and cooperation with the local population, the balance 
of counterterrorism operations is devastatingly out of kilter. Security forces have 
not only failed to leverage whatever willingness to cooperate there may have been 
in frontline communities, but they have also fostered a growing sense of grievance 
and frustration among those affected.
International actors have remained complicit, as governments have contrib-
uted to the ethnicisation of the conflict by intervening via local proxies, targeting 
specific groups (especially Fulani), and by failing to decisively counter growing anti-
Fulani resentment in society and public discourse. For example, Niger’s military 
cross-border cooperation with Malian rebel groups in 2017–2018 that was per-
ceived as anti-Fulani weakened the government’s position among Fulani in Niger 
(International Crisis Group 2020b). The day-to-day harassment and general suspi-
cion experienced by Fulani populations, as well as abuses by security forces (such 
as summary executions by the Burkinabé military; Human Rights Watch 2019), 
have increased resentment, discontent, and a sense of marginalisation. Govern-
ment attempts to address this issue have regularly fallen short. For example, Niger 
has made attempts to bridge divides between security forces and local populations 
by integrating local recruits into state security forces. However, these efforts ap-
pear to have largely failed due to a lack of trust – as well as to favouritism and 
the non-transparent awarding of posts (International Crisis Group 2020b: 10). In 
Burkina Faso, attempts to delegate enforcement tasks to local self-defence militias 
have amounted to taking sides in local conflicts, thus further eroding government 
legitimacy (International Crisis Group 2020a: 22ff.). 
Despite commitments to “integrated” approaches to security and development, 
international actors have, in practice, mostly focused on singular political objec-
tives – be they counterterrorism, migration control, or development. Rhetorically, 
the integration of security, development, migration, and climate change-mitigation 
policy in the Sahel plays a prominent role, but this purported integration exists 
only at a very high level of abstraction. On the ground, these efforts are neither co-
ordinated nor necessarily compatible, and fraught with logical gaps. For example, 
it is often maintained that creating economic opportunities for youth contributes 
to security by reducing vulnerability to jihadist recruitment. In practice, this is a 
far-fetched argument. First, there is a mismatch between the scale of the problem 
and the capacity of traditional development aid to resolve it in the short term. Sec-
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ond, the geographic foci of employment and economic opportunity programmes 
differs from the loci of jihadist activity. Conflict-affected areas remain out of reach 
for most traditional development programmes, due to security concerns. Third, the 
number of people recruited into jihadist groups is actually very small. While there 
is little data on jihadist fighters’ actual motivation to join, anecdotal evidence points 
more to past experiences of injustice rather than mere economic co-optation (Inter-
national Crisis Group 2017). The gap between assumptions and local realities of 
“integrated” policy approaches thus seems to be significant. 
Finally, international engagement lacks a convincing and legitimising narrative 
that is powerful enough to counter the widespread scepticism and growing public 
resentment against international actors. For example, in view of the Malian expe-
rience, Burkina Faso’s government faces domestic pressures that make it nearly 
impossible to publicly commit to an international military presence – perhaps for 
good reasons. The scope for cooperation would increase if international actors had 
a clear political strategy supported by a large public majority in each country. 
Faced with the accelerating erosion of state capacity and social order in the 
Sahel region, governments and the international community now have to confront 
an uncomfortable truth: The damage done by jihadist groups is irreversible in the 
short-term, and current approaches offer no way to end the problem or return to the 
previous status quo. Like in Afghanistan, a military victory in the asymmetric war 
against jihadists remains elusive (Michailoff 2018). Militarily, it may be possible to 
displace jihadists from a particular area. However this will not necessarily dimin-
ish the problem, as jihadist groups remain highly mobile and are becoming more 
and more a pan-African phenomenon. For the years to come, governments of the 
Sahel region and their international partners should therefore expect to live with 
a lingering presence of jihadist groups not just in the Western Sahel but in many 
parts of the African continent, from the Maghreb to Mozambique. Given this real-
ity, it is important to develop effective strategies to minimise the impacts of violent 
jihadism on states and societies, to prevent the region from devolving into further 
violence and state failure. 
Rethinking Political Priorities
Going forward, governments and their international partners should focus on dam-
age control: Making state structures and local communities resilient enough to car-
ry on, even as they are under continued threat by jihadist groups. This will require 
several strategic readjustments: First, stopping practices that further undermine 
state legitimacy, especially abuses and repression by security forces. Second, taking 
action to defuse the potential for intercommunal violence, by addressing growing 
injustices and economic grievances and (re-)establishing a basic social contract be-
tween states and local communities. Third, designing security policy on the basis of 
realistic assumptions and from a long-term perspective. 
To stop governments from further undermining their own legitimacy, interna-
tional actors have an essential role to play. Given security forces’ lack of domestic 
political accountability, the political pressure and the resources to address this is-
sue must come from the international community instead. Abuses and repression 
against civilians should be raised at the highest political levels, and international 
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support should be conditional on their cessation. However, in addition, govern-
ments must be put in a position to overcome political resistance to security-sector 
reform. 
 • Since the Northern Mali conflict of 2012, the corruption, incapacity, and un-
accountability of security forces have been correctly identified as among the 
central obstacles to stabilising the state and countering the jihadist threat. Yet 
despite these well-known issues, no progress has been achieved in terms of 
security-sector reform, possibly because of international hesitation to meddle 
with the internal political affairs of government partners. Within the domestic 
political scene, however, militaries have proven powerful enough to suppress 
any initiatives seeking comprehensive security-sector reform. The military’s 
siding with anti-government protesters in Burkina Faso in 2014 and in Mali in 
2020 has given the former further leeway to evade political accountability: pub-
lic pressure tends to crystallise more around economic grievances and civilian 
corruption than civil–military relations. Poorly resourced investigative media 
and civil society organisations fight an uphill battle for accountability, while 
growing militarism mutes criticism in public discourse. In this political envir-
onment, international actors have a pre-eminent role to play in advocating for 
security-sector reform, in developing a political vision for it, and in fostering a 
coalition of civilian government and civil society strong enough to stand up to 
pushback from military leaders. 
To address the erosion of social order in conflict-affected areas, security and devel-
opment policy should be reoriented towards (re-)establishing a basic social contract 
between the state and local communities. 
 • The prevention of intercommunal violence should be a top priority, due to its 
high escalation potential. In this respect, it will be essential to address the am-
bivalent role of self-defence militias. The latter have become increasingly re-
sponsible for civilian deaths and abuses, but they also fill a critical gap in local 
security, while being informally accountable to their communities and often 
perceived as more legitimate than state security forces (International Crisis 
Group 2020a). What they currently lack is the commitment and capacity to 
de-escalate local conflicts and to contribute to conflict management and recon-
ciliation. Where disarmament does not find local support, it might be more 
successful to promote cross-ethnic integration, conflict management, and the 
de-escalation capacity of self-defence groups. 
 • New institutional approaches must be found to minimise the unintended con-
sequences of counterterrorism operations. For example, elected local govern-
ments and other local stakeholders could be given a role in their planning and 
monitoring. In Burkina Faso, for instance, elected local governments are the 
only democratically legitimated authorities at the local level. Yet, they are 
reduced to passive accomplices to the security forces, as they are ordered to 
provide input to and information for security operations by the police, gen-
darmerie, or military, but are rarely (if ever) consulted about their goals and 
outcomes. This erodes their already fragile legitimacy in the eyes of the local 
population. 
 • Governments must find ways to increase responsiveness to local needs in  areas 
that are at risk of being destabilised by jihadist groups. For example, central 
governments could consider deploying local coordinators of government re-
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sponses who are tasked with assessing communities’ needs and grievances 
and initiating fast-tracked reactions from central government structures, aid 
organisations, and non-governmental organisations. To be effective, local coor-
dinators would need to report directly to the highest levels of government, by-
passing regional administrative structures and line ministries. They would also 
have to be free of conflicts of interest and would need to be protected against 
retaliation from jihadists. 
 • Overcoming the isolation of conflict-affected and at-risk communities should 
be a central priority for development policy. The disruption of economic ties, 
administrative services, and political representation has left many communi-
ties vulnerable to intimidation by jihadists, and created socially and economi-
cally precarious situations that the latter were able to exploit. To counter this, 
governments and aid organisations could prioritise policy measures that safe-
guard the transportation of people and goods in and out of at-risk areas, secure 
market access, and improve cell phone and mobile Internet coverage where 
necessary. Methods of remote administration and service delivery could be de-
veloped to mitigate the impacts of forced displacement, abandonment of public 
infrastructures, and public health restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
In the medium-term, investments in paved roads that are secured by surveil-
lance technology might help to reduce vulnerability to attacks, while also pro-
viding opportunities for local job creation. 
Finally, combatting violent jihadist groups in the Sahel requires gradual, long-term 
strategies. 
 • Negotiation and conflict de-escalation with jihadist groups are increasingly be-
ing considered by Mali and Niger, whereas France and Burkina Faso continue 
to reject it categorically (Thurston 2020). Rather than dismissing negotiations 
from the outset, international actors could consider the possibility that they 
might actually weaken jihadist groups in the long run, by incentivising them 
to limit their areas of operation or to refrain from escalating intercommunal 
conflicts, or by deepening internal rifts between fanatics and opportunists. [2] 
However since negotiations with jihadists can, at best, mitigate the symptoms 
of the crisis, governments should be careful not to make concessions that limit 
their ability to re-design their intervention strategies and to rebuild their au-
thority in the long run. 
 • A better understanding of jihadists’ strategic decision-making could go a long 
way in reducing their ability to inflict harm on states and societies. This re-
quires some mental flexibility from political decision-makers. Rather than 
portraying jihadist groups as an abstract, amorphous threat that ought to be 
countered with the comprehensive and uncompromising presence of security 
forces, greater emphasis could be placed on pre-empting likely targets, mini-
mising vulnerability, and preventing individual attacks from having broader 
social consequences. 
 • To target jihadists’ ability to recruit new members, various forms of counter-
recruitment could be explored. This would involve identifying the people who 
are most likely to be targeted by jihadists, especially those who have suffered 
injustice at the hands of the state or local actors, redress their grievances if pos-
sible, and recruit them for the state’s efforts to combat jihadism. Counter-re-
 
2 Studies by the Inter-
national Crisis Group 
(2019b) and the Berghof 
Center (Roetman, Migeon, 
and Dudouet 2019) have 
recently examined potential 
avenues for dialogue in the 
cases of Katiba Macina 
and Ansar Dine in Mali, 
with mixed results. 
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cruitment efforts could also focus on motivating defection from jihadist groups, 
as well as infiltrating them. 
 • Finally, greater importance should be placed on undercutting jihadists’ revenue 
sources, weakening their internal cohesion, and countering their intimidation 
and recruitment strategies. In this respect, methods from combatting organ-
ised crime may prove more effective against jihadist groups in the Sahel than 
military counter-insurgency operations. This may involve infiltrating and ob-
serving these groups, strengthening intelligence on their supply chains, sources 
of financing, and social interactions, and exploring possibilities of weakening 
their internal cohesion or creating conditions under which rival factions are 
more likely to turn against each other. Most importantly, it requires gaining 
the trust of ordinary citizens and protecting those who stand up against jihadist 
intimidation.
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